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THE IMMACULATE DECEPTION:
HOW THE HOLY GRAIL OF
PROTECTIONISM LED TO THE GREAT
STEROID ERA
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD REVOKE BASEBALL'S
ANTITRUST BOONDOGGLE
ELDON L. HAM*

When the Supreme Court says baseball isn't run like a
business, everybody jumps up and down with joy. When I say
the same thing, everybody throws pointy objects at me. 1 2
Bill Veeck
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court may have thought itself cerebral,
innovative, clever, cute, or perhaps all of those, but its controversial 1922
antitrust ruling in FederalBaseball Club v. National League3 has nonetheless
wreaked havoc on the business of professional baseball for over eight decades,
4
including what is now being called "The Great Steroid Era."
The ensuing legal and commercial mayhem is well documented, but it
extended far beyond the obvious, reaffirming the "law of unintended
Adjunct professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law; the sports legal analyst for WSCR Radio
in Chicago; J.D. from the Chicago-Kent College of Law in 1976 and his B.S. in Finance from the
University of Illinois in 1973; founder of Eldon L. Ham, P.C.
1. PAUL DICKSON, BASEBALL'S GREATEST QUOTATIONS 456 (1991).

2. Veeck was a baseball fan, owner, and innovator, who as a young man planted the first ivy at
Chicago's famed Wrigley Field. Nick Acocella, Baseball's Showman, ESPN.COM, Aug. 20, 2006,
http://espn.go.com/classic/veeckbill000816.html.
Veeck later became principal owner of the
Cleveland Indians (1948) where he signed the first African-American players in the American
League, then owned the St. Louis Browns (1951) and Chicago White Sox twice (1959 and 1977). Id.
He was widely known for marching midget Eddie Gaedel to the plate, who then walked on four
pitches for the Browns in 1951. Id.
3. See generally Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) [hereinafter Fed.
Baseball].
4. Baseball's Steroid Era: News, Lists, Timelines, Quotes, Statistics, BASEBALLSSTEROIDERA.

COM, http://www.baseballssteroidera.com (last visited October 18, 2008).
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consequences," a cause-and-effect mandate that inevitably plays a large role in
history, politics, law, and sports. No better archetype can be found than the
logic-bending anomaly we call baseball's antitrust exemption. Major League
Baseball's exalted legal status, and the reckless arrogance such protectionism
necessarily fosters, has contributed one way or another to racism, indentured
players, the ascension of baseball's powerful labor union, a host of lawsuits
from Charlie Finley and Ted Turner to Vincent Piazza and beyond,65 and
Commissioner Peter Ueberroth's collusion conspiracy during the 1980s.
So far, baseball's curious antitrust enigma has largely escaped blame as a
contributing factor to the steroid era, an unfortunate period of Nero-like
fiddling by both the big leagues and the baseball union. But, indeed, such a
court-made exemption may very well have been the original domino in a long
line of events that eventually pushed baseball into a complicity of contraband,
falsehoods, and marquee home runs.
Observers of law and sports are keenly aware of the notorious 1919 Black
Sox World Series, the singular "baseball is not interstate commerce" antitrust
exemption bestowed by the Supreme Court three years later in 1922, 7 and the
great steroid controversy that dogs baseball in the new millennium. Is it
possible, even likely, that those seemingly disparate events are related?
The first two, the Black Sox and the Federal Baseball antitrust decision,
took place almost concurrently, but history largely overlooks their very close
ties. Both werefauxpas of a sort, and not only did the former likely influence
the latter, they both may have been rigged. Nearly all manipulation has a
price, and the distortion of markets, law, or truth, let alone all three
concurrently, assures an artificial playing field that invites the law of
unintended consequences. Major League Baseball is no exception, and it is
now paying the price. In more primal terms, baseball played with fire for too
long and has gotten badly burned, most recently and very profoundly by the
steroid era. Fully understanding how that came to be is a necessary first step
to invoking the ultimate cure, an antidote that begs Congress to repeal the
absurd baseball antitrust exemption because, among other reasons, it is a false
law built on a false premise that has become the embarrassing Holy Grail of
American protectionism-all of which has contributed to much aberrant
behavior, probably including the steroid era.

5. See, e.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
6. For a detailed analysis of the baseball collusion arbitrations, see Marc Edelman, Has Collusion
Returned to Baseball?,24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 159 (2004).
7. See Fed.Baseball, 259 U.S. 200.
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WHY BASEBALL MATTERS

Baseball, like hope, springs eternal. With each new big league season, we
are reminded why this particular rite of passage is about more than just a
pastime. Baseball, with its long ties to our fathers and their grandfathers,
American culture, law, and even Congress, virtually is us.
In 1958, Congress grilled baseball's irascible Casey Stengel and the fairhaired Mickey Mantle about baseball antitrust, inspiring a diatribe of
Stengelese followed by Mantle's own brief account that brought the house
down, loosely paraphrased as "I agree with him." 8 More recently, Congress
has devoted as much time to baseball steroids as most issues, and Capitol Hill
has taken more than a little flack for such indulgences. But Congress is right,
and should still do more.
Sports influence America-and the world-in deeply profound ways,
pulling us forward much like art or literature, but more tangibly and often
more forcefully. Nowhere is that more acutely apparent than with the
Olympic Games, whether in 2008, 1984, 1980, 1972, or 1968-all recent
Olympic years with politicized agendas. Indeed, one of the great sports
blunders in modern times may have been Hitler's 1936 Olympic challenge to
Jesse Owens and the other African-American sprinters who upstaged the
Aryan Nazis on and off the track. 9 The Americans proved themselves much
faster, but the Nazi "blunder" demonstrated even more: black athletes can be
as good or better than most, a milestone that would inevitably transcend
sports.
In America, baseball is our oldest major team sport, and so its legacy is
both enduring and often profound. 10 Jesse Owens had competed against long
jumper Mack Robinson, older brother and inspiration to Jackie Robinson, who
later won the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) long jump title
himself and then became the Jackie Robinson who changed baseball, if not
America itself. Two years after Jackie's big league debut, the state of Kansas
passed a school segregation law that would be struck down by Brown v. Board
of Education1 1 in 1954. In the text of its opinion, the Supreme Court stated

8. Baseball Almanac, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/quotes/casey-stengel-senate-testimony.
shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
9. History Learning Site, http://www.historyleamingsite.co.uk/1936_berlin-olympics.htm (last
visited Sept. 28, 2008).
10. Major League Baseball is traced to 1876, while the NHL began in 1917, followed by the NFL
(1920) and the NBA (1946). See Cliff Christl, Detiny's Darlings; Traditions Set Teams Apart,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 11, 2003, at Cl.
11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the visible success of "Negroes" in America, 12 but in those days their most
noted success was evidenced by the front page sports headlines of Jackie
Robinson, Satchel Paige, Willie Mays, and a rookie named Hank Aaron who
clubbed his first home run the very same year as the Brown decision. Baseball
may still be known for its regrettable history of overt segregation, but it did
integrate itself with spectacular success seven full years before our Supreme
Court did the same for public education.
So when baseball wrongfully led our nation, especially our youth, down
the steroid path of decadence and deceit, it meant much more than just who
"ripped off' the most home runs. Baseball is our oldest, most revered, most
celebrated major team sport, but it let America down not just with steroids, but
with deception. Baseball looked the other way, perhaps hoping the steroid era
would be without notice or blame, something like an "immaculate" deception.
Eventually baseball only reluctantly invoked a testing program, which, at first,
was embarrassingly weak. But why the arrogance? How did baseball believe
it could get away with such a ruse?
THE HOLY GRAIL OF PROTECTIONISM

Although not as dramatic as the Salem witch trials nor as sweeping as the
Plessy "separate but equal doctrine," 13 the baseball antitrust boondoggle is no
less obtuse and begs for reversal. In 1972, the Supreme Court expressly
recognized the need for change, but then left the task of undoing this absurd
exemption to Congress. 14 Given the continuing impact of the original
decision, not to mention its checkered history in the first place, the time has
long come for Congress to intercede.
Major League Baseball is a profoundly visible interstate business as well
as an American icon, but the true need for intervention is much more than
philosophical. The antitrust exemption has wreaked havoc on American sports
history, enslaved the game's best human resources during baseball's golden
ages, and insulated baseball from normal business competition. Although the
Curt Flood Act of 1998 and the non-statutory labor exemption provide partial
relief to the players themselves, 15 baseball still enjoys a governmentsanctioned license to muscle its own team owners, vendors, and the public at
large.

12. See id.
13. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
14. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
15. Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b, named for outfielder Curt Flood in recognition of
Flood's role as plaintiff in Flood v. Kuhn.
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There can be little wonder, then, about the source of baseball's arrogance
as the steroid era emerged. Much has been written and debated about whyor whether-the game simply grew intoxicated with the marquee excitement
of record home runs, all in the wake of the 1994 labor action and canceled
World Series that left much of America soured on baseball. 16 Clearly the
finer details of how or why the steroid era got started can be analyzed ad
infinitum, but however baseball got there, it did so for the same fundamental
reason a child steals a cookie: baseball believed it could.
THE BASEBALL ENIGMA

In FederalBaseball, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. penned the most
famous ruling in the history of organized sports and virtually exempted the
business of Major League Baseball from the reach of federal antitrust laws,
particularly Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 17 To this day, the
Federal Baseball finding remains an out-of-step, even preposterous legal
ruling, and a particularly egregious beacon of hypocrisy in today's world of
billion dollar sports moguls where the National Basketball Association (NBA),
the National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL)
are expressly subject to such antitrust laws, while Major League Baseball still
is not. 18
Congress bears enough credibility issues without also embracing the
disingenuous Federal Baseball directive in the face of logic-namely, that
giving exhibitions of baseball is a business that concerns "purely state
affairs."' 19 Even in 1922, Major League Baseball was in full literal swing
behind the likes of Babe Ruth and Rogers Hornsby as teams chugged from
state to state performing before millions of fans for millions of dollars.
Change that revenue to billions of dollars, then add air travel, radio, television,
product endorsements, and now, a good deal of alleged drug trafficking,
baseball's role as an interstate business becomes overwhelmingly self-evident.
Yet Federal Baseball continues as a discomforting affront to law and a
mockery of precedent that boldly allows baseball to operate a lucrative game
that is run like a business with a free wink at law and reason.
The 1922 Court may simply have been wrong, delusional, or possibly
16. Ed Grabianowski, How Strikes Work, HowSUFFWORKS.COM, http://people.howstuffworks.

com/strike4.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
17. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2007); Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League,
259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).

18. See Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
19. Fed. Baseball,259 U.S. at 208.
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lured by an ends-justify-the-means reaction to concerns over baseball
gambling. But fifty years later, when the Court considered the plight of star
player Curt Flood, who was caught in the grip of baseball's reserve clause,
Major League Baseball was no longer seriously vulnerable to gamblers, yet it
was still left very much immune from competition. 20 The Flood v. Kuhn
Court expressly acknowledged the errors of Federal Baseball but then did
nothing, other than to blame Congress for its "positive inaction." 2 1 Justices
Marshall and Brennan disagreed, calling for the Supreme Court to reverse
itself without the aid of Congress: "It is this Court that has made [the players]
impotent, and this Court should correct its error." 22 Marshall and Brennan
were right, and had the rest of the Court listened, the steroid era might never
have happened, assuming the game's resulting arrogance would likely have
been tempered long ago.
But for over three decades since Flood, Washington has failed to take the
hint. Congress could continue to pretend that FederalBaseball is legitimate
precedent or maybe just some kind of American frolic in a mischievous Huck
Finn manner; but how can Capitol Hill keep looking the other way, especially
since the ruling was likely an abuse of power in the first place? Simply stated,
baseball's antitrust exemption is much more than a legal paradox; it persists
unnecessarily as a testament to twentieth century skullduggery that is now
perpetuated by twenty-first century blinders.
FEDERAL BASEBALL: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT REALLY SAID

Commonly misquoted, the 1922 ruling did not expressly find that
"baseball is not a business." 23 The real crux of the decision is that Major
League Baseball was deemed not to be a business in interstate commerce, thus
rendering it a "pastime" that is merely a "state affair" beyond the reach of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
Short on words if not logic, the entire Federal Baseball opinion is all of
two pages long. 24 Remarkably, though, the text actually gets everything right
except the conclusion. The plaintiff was the Baltimore franchise of the upstart
Federal League, which began play in 1914,25 the same year that Congress
enacted the Clayton Act which provided for private antitrust suits, treble

20. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 258 (1972).
21. Id. at 283.
22. Id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23. See generally Fed.Baseball, 259 U.S. at 200.
24. Id.

25. Id.
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damages, and injunctive relief.26 Soon thereafter, in 1915, the new Federal
League sued the National League for antitrust violations arising out of
baseball's use of its rigid reserve language used to prevent players from
bolting to the new league. A settlement was arm-twisted by the trial judge, but
one team, the Baltimore franchise, refused to sign and dogmatically pressed
upward to the Supreme Court.
Justice Holmes's Federal Baseball opinion recounted the facts,
highlighted by the following:
The clubs composing the Leagues are in different cities and
for the most part in different States. The end of the elaborate
organizations and sub-organizations that are described in the
pleadings and evidence is that these clubs shall play against
one another in public exhibitions for money, one or the other
club crossing a state line in order to make the meeting
possible ....
Of course the scheme [emphasis added] requires
constantly repeated travelling [sic] on the part of the clubs,
which is provided for, controlled and disciplined by the
organizations, and this it is said means commerce among the
States.27

Obviously Holmes got the essence of the business exactly right, especially
his telling use of the word "scheme" since antitrust is defined as a "contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade." 28 But then he obliquely
draws the wrong conclusion:
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball [sic], which are
purely state affairs. But the fact that in order to give the
exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross
state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not
enough to change the character of the business. 29
Had Holmes and the whole Court gone mad? Were they simply
delusional, or maybe just plain wrong, failing to understand either the game of
baseball or the nature of interstate commerce? Neither seems likely, of course.
But there is overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the Court may have
been seduced by an ulterior agenda.

26. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2002); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2007).
27. Fed. Baseball,259 U.S. at 208.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 208-09.
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MANIPULATING HISTORY

By the time Federal Baseball reached the Supreme Court, Kenesaw
Mountain Landis 30 had already been appointed the game's first independent
commissioner. With a clear mandate to purge the game from the pandemic of
illicit baseball gambling that had just tarnished the 1919 World Series, Landis
proceeded to garner unprecedented centralized authority for the
commissioner's office-and himself.
Landis had previously been a hard-nosed federal trial judge in Chicago, an
antitrust expert who had already rocked the Standard Oil behemoth with a then
staggering $29,240,000 fine for antitrust violations. 31 The pervasive Sherman
Antitrust Act, 32 established in 1890 to counter a host of perceived robber
barons of the post Civil War industrial era, was an inspiration for ambitious
federal trust busters who had already focused on the American steel, railroad,
and petroleum industries.
Landis was also a baseball fanatic with close ties to the Cubs and enjoyed
personal allegiances to the Chicago White Sox as well. 33 Most significantly,
though, Landis was also the very same trial judge who had overseen the
original FederalBaseball case and had bullied the eventual settlement among
all parties except the rogue Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore. In so doing,
Landis issued a prescient warning to all concerned: "Both sides must
understand that any blows to a thing called base ball [sic] would be regarded
by this court as a blow to a national institution." No wonder all but one party
settled.
The Federal League may have brought suit in Chicago precisely because
of Landis's reputation for locking horns with big business. But the plaintiff
ball clubs may have misunderstood Landis's profound allegiance to baseball,
and so Landis probably surprised many by favoring the National League in an
act of baseball protectionism that captured the hearts, minds, and support of
the game's ownership cabal. By that time, baseball would have become
keenly aware of its own vulnerability to ambitious trust busters of the day, if
not more private sector lawsuits under the new Clayton Act, so the game's
30. Landis served as a federal judge from 1905 to 1922, and commissioner of Major League
Baseball from 1921 to his death in 1944. MLB History, Kenesaw Mountain Landis: First
Commissioner of Baseball, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.commlb/history/mlb-history-people'jsp?
story=comrnbio 1 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
31. The fine was imposed against Standard Oil of Indiana in 1907. Although later reversed on
appeal, it provided significant notoriety to Landis. See U.S. v. Standard Oil, 148 F.719 (D.C. Il1.
1907).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
33. Baseball Almanac, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/players/jim-landis-interview.shtml
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
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savvy owners lured Judge Landis as baseball's first, and most powerful,
independent commissioner.
But that was just the beginning. Commissioner Landis operated from
baseball's offices at 333 N. Michigan Avenue in Chicago, and for the first
years of his regime he maintained his dual role as both baseball commissioner
and an active federal district judge in Chicago. 34 This gave Landis enhanced
visibility and almost unbridled power, all while maintaining his direct ties
throughout the federal judiciary-at least until Congress threatened to impeach
35
him for it, forcing Landis to resign from the judiciary on February 22, 1922.
While his own FederalBaseball case continued to wind its way through
the appeals process all the way to the United States Supreme Court, Landis
had both the motive and the opportunity to influence the Court's perceptions
about baseball. Landis must have believed that he and the game needed
centralized power to both rein in the players and quash the scourge of
gambling to save the game, but such ubiquitous control would be vulnerable to
the Sherman Act so long as the wild card FederalBaseball appeal loomed.
As a battle-tested judge, Landis had long been developing a philosophy of
legal realism and judicial activism, suggesting he was receptive to an endsjustify-the-means approach to judicial intervention. Thus, with the requisite
opportunity, motive, and judicial philosophy in place, the possibility of Landis
tampering with legal process for a perceived higher good, especially for his
beloved baseball, is both intriguing and possible. But there is much more.
Enter William Howard Taft, the former president who at the time was the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and just as big a baseball fanatic as
Landis. 36 Not only had Taft played baseball at Yale, 37 at one time he had
been offered a contract to play professional ball for his hometown Cincinnati
Reds. 38 As president, Taft invoked the tradition of throwing the first honorary
pitch of the baseball season, and later Taft himself would turn down the
baseball commissioner's job before it was to be offered to Landis. Taft,
therefore, was linked directly to the game, if not to Landis, by means of both
baseball and the federal judiciary, but there remained still more compelling
34. Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/329376/Kenesaw-Mountain-Landis
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
35. Congress Was Hard on First Commissioner, THEFREELIBRARY.COM, http://www.thefree
library.com/Congress+was+hard+on+first+commissioner-aO 1610862746 (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
36. William Howard Taft was the twenty-seventh president of the United States and the tenth
Chief Justice, nominated by Warren G. Harding.
37. William Howard Taft University, William Howard Taft, President TAFTU.EDU, http://www.taftu.edu/resources.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).

Chief Justice,

38. William Howard Taft: Ohioan and 2 /h President of the United States, BBC.COM,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna12g2/A4429299 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
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connections to Landis and to the FederalBaseballcase itself.
Taft was president from 1909 to 1913, and his presidency is recognized
for its federal trust-busting efforts-some sources referring to the antitrust
prosecutions in those days as "vigorous" or even "relentless." 39 More
remarkably, Taft's half-brother Charles Phelps Taft was owner of the Chicago
Cubs from 1914 to 191640 during the precise period when the Federal League
was competing with the Cubs and all the National League, not to mention
actually suing Major League Baseball for antitrust violations in 1915. Thus,
the Taft family, or at least part of it, originally had a direct stake in the
outcome of the FederalBaseball litigation.
Taft was an especially powerful Chief Justice-as a matter of fact, as
president he himself had appointed six justices to the Court, two of whom
41
were still there when Federal Baseball, a unanimous ruling, was decided.
So Taft carried a great deal of influence and incumbent baggage, along with
his ties to antitrust and passionate devotion to baseball.
Landis could have taken his case for baseball protectionism directly to
Taft, but under the circumstances he might have been much more subtle by
invoking a behind the scenes whisper, a clandestine communiqu6 from an
intermediary, or even just a public hint that would have caught Taft's
attention. The real question, then, is not whether Landis could have exerted
influence-indeed that is a clear possibility-but, rather, how likely was it?
BASEBALL ANTITRUST: THE GREAT OXYMORON

Consider a binary premise of simple logic: either the Taft/Holmes Court
was rational or it was not. If not, then the FederalBaseball ruling was simply
irrational and baseball, therefore, had merely lucked out. But assuming the
more reasoned probability of a rational Court, history begs for an explanation.
Any such analysis leads to the ultimate inevitable question: did Holmes really
believe what he was saying-that big league baseball was not a business in
interstate commerce? If not, then there is no doubt the Court was up to
something. Therefore, in addition to recognizing all the suspicious and
compelling circumstances surrounding the Federal Baseball decision, it is
helpful to examine Holmes himself.

39. Presidents: William Howard Taft 1857-1930,
history.com/pagesihl009.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).

USHISTORY.COM,

http://www.u-s-

40. Major League Baseball, Chicago Cubs All-Time Owners, CUBS.COM, http://chicago.cubs.
mlb.com/chc/history/owners.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
41. Isaac M. McPhee, William Taft on the Supreme Court: A Former President'sLifelong Dream
Comes True, SUlTEIO.COM, May 19, 2008, http://americanhistory.suitel0l.com/article.cfm/
william taft onthesupremecourt.
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Holmes, like Landis, had embraced a brand of legal realism and judicial
activism. "The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience," 42 as
Holmes said, revealing an attitude about logic and law that may have justified
his approach to FederalBaseball. Tellingly, in May of 1923, exactly one year
after he penned the baseball antitrust exemption, Holmes wrote another
antitrust opinion that found, among other things, that a traveling vaudeville
enterprise could be a business in interstate commerce. In Hart v. B.F. Keith
Vaudeville Exchange, the manager for numerous traveling vaudeville
performers had brought suit under the Sherman Act against "a combination of
corporations engaged in similar business, and the owners of a large number of
43
theatres" known respectively as the Keith Circuit and the Orpheum Circuit.
The Federal Baseball case was central to the legal arguments and was even
cited in the eventual opinion. 44 Holmes must have recognized the impending
antitrust dilemma in comparing baseball and vaudeville, which could explain
this textual wrangling found in the Hart opinion:
It is alleged that a part of the defendants' business is making
contracts that call on performers to travel between the states
and from abroad and in connection therewith require the
transportation of large quantities of scenery, costumes, and
animals .... The defendants contend and the judge below was
of the opinion that the dominant object of all the arrangements
was the personal performance of the actors, all transportation
being merely incidental to that, and therefore that the case is
governed by FederalBase Ball Club v. National League. On
the other hand, it is argued that in the transportation of
vaudeville acts the apparatus sometimes is more important
than the performers, and that the defendants' conduct is within
the statue to that extent, at least .... The bill [in question] was
brought before the decision of the Base Ball Club case, and it
may be that what in general is incidental, in some instances
may rise to a magnitude that requires it to be considered
45
independently.
Holmes probably recognized the monster he had created to save baseball,
thus his above hint about the vaudeville interstate travel as more than just

42. Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/32013.html

2008).
43. Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exch., 262 U.S. 271, 272 (1923).
44. Id. at 273.
45. Id. at 272-73.

(last visited Sept. 28,
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"incidental. '4 6 He may or may not have actually believed in his own baseball
and vaudeville analyses, but Holmes seemed to be laying the groundwork to
reconcile the two. Without making these distinctions, the Federal Baseball
case could have eventually diluted the Sherman Act into a legal scrap heap.
But if Holmes had truly believed in FederalBaseball,why then did he press to
wriggle out of it in the vaudeville case?
Perhaps Holmes really did not believe in FederalBaseball. The Court had
normally applied broad criteria in finding interstate commerce, even ruling in
1911, in the midst of the Taft trust-busting presidency, that empty rail cars
47
moving in-state were in fact instruments of interstate commerce.
Considering the farcical reasoning of FederalBaseball and the wordsmithing
of the Hart decision, especially in view of the Court's line of commerce clause
cases, it is difficult to accept Holmes's sincerity. Did the Court really feel that
empty rail cars affect interstate commerce, 48 but filling them with ball players
to perform before millions in stadiums around the country reduced those same
49
cars to just "state affairs?"
The tell-tale fingerprints of Landis and Taft are smeared throughout the
four comers of the FederalBaseball opinion and beyond. Landis, the Federal
Baseball trial judge determined to rid baseball of gambling if not also save it
from the Federal League competition, and Taft, the baseball fanatic with
family ties to the competing National League Cubs, were both widely known
for their antitrust expertise and influence. So it strains credulity to believe that
Federal Baseball was simply the innocent product of misinformed great
minds. Since the Federal Baseball antitrust findings are asinine, at best, and
the baseball motives of Taft and Landis were overwhelming while the
concurrent circumstantial evidence is compelling, the more likely scenario is
an express or implied conspiracy. Perhaps it was driven by concerns over
league competition or fears about pervasive gambling-or maybe the latter
was a pretext for the former.
Considering all these possibilities in view of the Court's other decisions
about antitrust and interstate commerce, the true sui generis ends-justify-themeans role of Federal Baseball is inescapable: protect the game at all costs.
This theory is not hard to swallow, given all the circumstances.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
S. Rail Co. v. U.S., 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911).
Id.
Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
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STEROIDS: THE IMMACULATE DECEPTION

Was the steroid era another in a long line of baseball's ends-justify-themeans pattern of behavior? Few games can stir a bare-knuckled national
brawl quite like baseball. It is a swashbuckling sport built to swing for the
fences, and baseball will unabashedly move those fences, cork bats, steal
signs, walk midgets, drill batters, juice the ball, and even juice the players to
achieve its ends. Although many such baseball tactics are actually against the
rules, an acceptable part of baseball strategy has long included the art of rule
bending, deception, and cheating-at least within the acceptable tolerances of
the game, all of which invokes a sense of "all is fair in love and baseball"-an
inherent part of the game's charm.
But not all such skullduggery is equally appealing. Stealing signs is
"acceptable," if not expected, while kidnapping an opposing player is not.
Pretending to make a shoe-string catch in the outfield is readily accepted, but
sliding into second with high spikes is not. Pitching inside to intimidate power
hitters is expected and throwing at a batter is usually tolerated, while a fastball
to the head will likely bring retaliation. Indeed, one reason baseball has
become so sacrosanct is that it was created in the image of America itself.
These same hip-shooting competitive traits are found in free market capitalism
from Carnegie and Rockefeller to Steve Jobs and Bill Gates, not to mention
the free-wheeling hard-ball politics of democracy.
So how do steroids and other illegal performance enhancers fit into the
baseball paradigm? Is there a difference between illegal spitballs and illegal
steroids? Or what about faking a sweeping tag at second versus lying to
Congress?
In 1887, a Pittsburgh judge declared "baseball is one of the evils of the
day," 50 but today the lines separating evil from irreverence are blurred in real
life and in baseball. The game stirs the American soul because it is a chip-onthe-shoulder microcosm of who we are-an irreverent capitalist society
looking for an edge in business, life, and baseball. Baseball is an edgy game
of angles where the one cardinal rule is that all the other rules are
51
fundamentally suspect, and that was true when Ty Cobb played in 1910;
when Bill Veeck marched a midget to the plate in 1951;52 and when Yankee
50. J.W.F. White, a criminal court judge in Pittsburgh, lectured a convicted thief, warning him to
stay away from baseball games, calling Baseball "one of the evils of the day." BENJAMIN G. RADER,
BASEBABLL: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S GAME 50 (2002).
51. Baseball Library, http://www.baseballlibrary.com/ballplayers/player.php?name=ty-cobb1886 (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
52. The Shrine of Eternals: 1999 Electees, BASEBALLRELIQUARY.ORG, http://www.baseball
reliquarv.org/veeck.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
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Graig Nettles accidentally sprayed hidden super balls all over the infield when
he splintered his bat during a game in 1974.11
The difference is a matter of perspective, a function of intent, a difference
in reasonable expectations, and the possibility of harm to the game. Baseball,
therefore, deserves no free pass in today's steroid environment,
notwithstanding its innate passion, humor, ties to capitalism, or pervasive
mischief. Not only did steroids distort the game and the record books, they
distorted the players themselves, deceived the public, and were a health risk to
users, not to mention were and are illegal controlled substances in the first
place.
No one knows the precise date, but it appears the baseball steroid era crept
in sometime after the cancellation of the 1994 World Series. It may have been
caused by the great 1998 home run chase waged by power hitters Mark
McGwire and Sammy Sosa, the most riveting long ball year since Mantle and
Mars slugged it out in 1961. If McGwire and Sosa were on the juice, the
steroid era surely began then. If they were not, that banner year may still have
inspired others to dig a little deeper into their own bags of tricks where, alas,
they found steroids. Either way, 1998 suggests a good starting point.
But maybe both happened. McGwire later admitted to intentionally using
"almost steroids," 54 and more recently the embattled Barry Bonds admitted to
"accidentally using" a steroid cream. 55 Sosa has made no admissions, but his
transformation into a prodigious home run slugger has nonetheless been
suspect for a host of widely reported reasons.
Regardless, Major League Baseball found itself mired in a decade long
steroid controversy, with the after effects still lingering in the form of the
Mitchell Report, congressional intervention, suspicion of perjury, permanently
diluted records, possible latent health issues for the players who used them,
and the severely tarnished integrity of the game.
Steroids have been around for decades and were used in sports for years,
notably football. But the NFL invoked stringent testing with the cooperation
of its players association many years ago, yet both baseball and its certified
union resisted testing. 56

53. Phil Rogers, No Need for Sosa to Cheat; So Much Power, So Little Sense, CHI. TRIB., June
3, 2003, at C6.
54. John Shea, Baseball Hall of Fame - Loud and Clear: McGuire Falls Well Short of Needed
SupportforInduction, S.F. GATE, Jan. 10, 2007, at D1.
55. Barry Bonds Steroids Timeline, ESPN.coM, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=
3113127 (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
56. Both the league itself and the players' association have denied the foot dragging, but the facts
and testing history suggest otherwise, raising at least a viable question about timing, if not motives.
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Prior to the implementation of current testing policies, extensively
reported anecdotal evidence suggested that anywhere from twenty-five percent
to eighty-five percent of the Major League players were on steroids. 57 Things
began to change when Orioles prospect Steve Bechler collapsed and died of
heat stroke in February 2003, a tragedy that led the medical examiner to
ultimately conclude that Ephedra, a non-steroid supplement, contributed to the
player's death. 58 Almost immediately, Commissioner Selig banned Ephedra
from the minor leagues, but not the major leagues. One might surmise that
collective bargaining constraints and related legal issues may have played a
role in such delay.
In 1996, retired player Ken Caminiti, a former big league MVP, was
provided a detailed account of how his body deteriorated, which he believed
was primarily due to his own admitted use of steroids. 5 9 In 1998 both Sosa
and McGwire shattered the prior single season home run marks, and then each
clubbed over sixty homers again in 1999. Two years later, Bonds rewrote the
record books with seventy-three blasts, a year when the aging slugger became
thirty-seven years old. The Bonds home run adventure soon led to the Bay
Area Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO) investigation of an alleged steroid
distribution ring in the San Francisco area. 60 On March 17, 2005, a number of
players-including Jose Canseco, Rafael Palmeiro, Curt Schilling, Sosa and
McGwire-were brought before a congressional investigation. 6 1 By 2006, an
expos6 book titled Game of Shadows was published revealing, in great alleged
detail, a number of claims that support the use of steroids by Bonds and many
other players connected to the BALCO source including, among others, Jason
Giambi and Canseco himself.62
By March of 2006, former Senator George Mitchell was appointed by
Commissioner Selig to spearhead a thorough investigation into the Major
League Baseball steroid issue, including the alleged use by players and the
57. Pitcher David Wells estimated the figure at twenty-five percent to forty percent, Jose
Canseco has suggested it was as high as eighty-five percent. ESPN Baseball, Well Claims "25 to 40
Percent" ofPlayers Use Steroids, ESPN.coM, http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2003/0227/1515302.html
(last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
58. Ray Mileur, Steve Bechler Dies at 23 Plenty of Blame to Go Around, BASEBALL
LIBRARY.COM, http://www.baseballlibrary.com/baseballlibrary/submit/MileurRayl.
stm (last

visited Sept. 28, 2008).
59. Tom Verducci, Totally Juiced, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, June 3, 2002, available at
http://vault.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG 1025902/index.htm.
60. Balco Investigation Timeline, USATODAY.CoM, http://usatoday.com/sports/balco-timeline.
htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).

61. Balco Investigation: Key Players, USAToDAY.COM, http://usatoday.com/sports/balcotimeline.htm#021204 (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
62. See MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS (2006).
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curious evolution of baseball's steroid policies. Such investigation led to the
an
Mitchell Report, a 409 page analysis of steroids in baseball, including
63
assessment of fault and recommendations for cleaning up the sport.
The newest round of MLB testing policies were implemented in late 2005,
replacing the weaker original policies. As of January 2005, an initial positive
test would result in a ten-game suspension, the second positive brought thirty
games, then sixty games for a third. Ultimately, it took a fourth positive result
to bring a one-year suspension. Still, this policy had more teeth than the one
implemented in 2002, which only provided for mandatory treatment for a first
time offense, kept the player's name confidential, and took five failures to
cause a one-year suspension. Such 2002 policy generated no player
suspensions in all of 2004. The 2005 version adopted in January provided that
offenders would be named and suspended, then the league implemented the
tougher policy in November of that year, calling for a fifty-game suspension
upon the first test failure.
Steroids are not addictive like cocaine or certain other recreational drugs,
so there was little apparent justification for such a weak policy that took three
failed tests to generate a meaningful suspension. After the 2005 season,
baseball then tightened its policy to provide for a fifty-game suspension on the
first test failure, one hundred games for the second, and finally a lifetime
suspension after the third.
Compare all of this to the policy long utilized in conjunction with the
Olympic Games where one positive yielded a two-year suspension, two
failures brought a lifetime ban. The NFL reacted to steroids much sooner than
baseball did, although it continues to revise and strengthen its own policies.
The NFL began steroid testing policy in 1986 and then, according to the
former NFL steroid oversight advisor, who resigned in 1990, about thirty
percent of players in the league tested positive at first, yet received only
warnings. 64 Then the league began suspending players in 1989, when thirteen
65
of them received four-game suspensions (about a month each).
Baseball, on the other hand, seemed impervious to the mounting steroid
evidence through the 1990s, a point corroborated by the exhaustive Mitchell
Report (the Report) issued in December of 2007. The Report listed eighty-six
names tied, variously, to the baseball steroid era, including seven MVPs,
63. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING

SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (2007) (prepared statements of George J.

Mitchell, United States Senator) [hereinafter THE MITCHELL

REPORT].

64. The San Diego Union-Tribune, Timeline, S[GNONSANDIEGO.COM, http://www.signonsan

diego.com/uniontrib/2008092 1/news_l s2I nfltim.htmI (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
65. Timothy W. Smith, NFL's Steroid Policy Too Lax, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, at B7.
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thirty-one All-Stars, and notably pitching icon Roger Clemens who was
66
mentioned no fewer than eighty-two times in the Report.
Mitchell found plenty of blame. "Everyone involved in baseball over the
past two decades - commissioners, club officials, the players' association, and
players - shares to some extent the responsibility for the steroids era. There
was a collective failure to recognize the problem as it emerged and to deal
with it early on." 6 7
The requisite deception, then, was anything but
"immaculate."
The breakdowns that led to the steroid era began at least as early as 1922
when Kenesaw Landis muscled those who participated in the 1919 Black Sox
debacle. History largely forgets that the game had already been infested with
gamblers for many years, with rampant betting in the stands even as the game
was being played. 6 8 Some even suggest the very first World Series in 1903
may have been rigged. 69 So when Landis cleaned house, he just kept going,
eventually hedging all bets with the Holy Grail of protectionism in the form of
baseball's antitrust immunity.
Baseball created a world all its own without fear of retribution. It ran an
overtly segregated empire until 1947.70 Baseball owners controlled player
labor until Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally successfully arbitrated the
infamous reserve clause and discovered that its perpetual grip of contract
renewals was a one-time provision and not an infinite lock on a player's
services. 7 1 Baseball even resisted the advent of radio in the early 1920s, even
though radio would soon spread baseball's reach far beyond the ballpark and
largely influence the voices of summer that represent today's game. The
owners were initially afraid of radio, thinking it would keep the fans away
instead of acting as a magnet by reaching those who otherwise would never
have been exposed to the game.
When baseball first discovered home runs as a marquee draw in 1918-

66. Mitchell Report: Baseball Slow to React to Players' Steroid Use, ESPN.COM, Dec. 14,
2007, http://sports/espn.go.com/espn/print?id=3153509&type=story.
67. Bob Nightengale, Mitchell Report: Steroid Woes a "Collective Failure", USATODAY.
COM, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2007-12-13-mitchell-reportN.htm (last visited Sept.

28, 2008).
68. ROGER I. ABRAMS, THE FIRST WORLD SERIES 92 (2003).
69. Id. at 93
70. A chief catalyst to Jackie Robinson was the death of Kenesaw Landis in 1944. In 1945,
Branch Rickey signed Robinson to a minor league deal and then brought him to the majors in 1947.
Dave Kindred, Jackie Robinson: One Man, Alone, SPORTINGNEWS.COM, http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/baseball/2007-12-1 3-mitchell-reportN.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
71. Nat'l & Am. League Prof'I Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 66
LAB. ARB. 101, 118 (1976).
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1920, long before 1998, they simply changed the game. Before Ruth, the
home run leaders would club only nine or ten long balls a year. But when
Ruth was shipped to the Big Apple in 1920, the game changed. The spitball
had been perfectly legal since its "discovery" sometime around 1905, but in
1920 it was suddenly banned. Yankee Stadium had begun, eventually opening
in 1923 with a very short right field porch (294 feet), almost certainly to
exploit Ruth's left-handed power. Over the decades, baseball has unabashedly
manipulated the game on the field by banning the spitter, lowering the
pitcher's mound, changing the makeup of the ball, inserting the designated
hitter, excluding African-Americans, and then re-inserting them, too, as it
desired.
Off the field, baseball almost certainly hustled the antitrust
boondoggle.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

All those actions on and off the field of play affected the game in ways
that were both foreseen and unforeseen, but nowhere was the law of
unintended consequences more pervasive than regarding the antitrust
exemption. That legal anomaly altered the game in a myriad of ways,
including the eventual unionization of baseball, the baseball collusion case,
and probably even "The Great Steroid Era."
When the players butted against the antitrust exemption time and time
again, coming up empty, even in the Flood Supreme Court decision of 1972
even though the Court actually agreed with Flood, the players and union chief
Marvin Miller were forced into a different direction. 72 They chose to abandon
antitrust, then adopted a plan to attack the game's power through the federal
labor laws, initially by challenging the reserve clause in 1976 through
McNally and Messersmith. 73 They won immediately, strengthening both the
union and their resolve.
The exemption directly caused the great baseball collusion of the 1980s.
Baseball felt secure in its antitrust immunity, so the owners met and overtly
conspired to suppress player compensation. The scheme failed not because of
antitrust, but because the owners forgot about the "no joint negotiating" clause
that had already been inserted into the collective bargaining agreement. The
clause was intended to prevent the threat of joint player hold-outs like the one
pulled by Dodger pitching icons Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale who
successfully arm-twisted the Dodgers in 1966 making them at that time the

72. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
73. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Player's Ass'n, 409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D.
Mo. 1976), affd by, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
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highest paid pair of teammates in history. But that same clause operated both
ways, and the owners got nailed with a billion dollar collusion case.
Ultimately the antitrust exemption influenced the great steroid era because
it was inevitable. The baseball labor wars that followed Messersmith in 1976
were contentious, but successful and lucrative for the players. The labor
action in 1994 caused the embattled owners to dig in and cancel the World
Series. 74 They assumed the fans would forget, but they were wrong. Through
it all, baseball maintained its arrogance and, for some reason, avoided a viable
testing program for performance enhancing drugs. They were vigilant in
dogging the users of recreational drugs, like with the likes of Steve Howe and
Darryl Strawberry, but when Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire slammed the
1998 season into the record books, baseball was electrified, fans returned, and
1994 was finally forgotten.
Speculation is no longer needed about how the steroid era evolved. There
is no shortage of anecdotal evidence plus player admissions, expos6 books by
both journalists and players (notably Jose Canseco 7 5), sworn testimonies and,
ultimately, the extensive Mitchell Report. Home runs were flying out of
ballparks from coast to coast as Major League Baseball fell further behind the
NFL and NBA in its steroid testing programs. Major League Baseball allowed
the steroid era to happen, and curiously, the players' union did little to
intervene, even though the issue directly impacts the playing conditions,
health, and safety of the players. But why did all this happen? In science, life,
and law, the simplest explanation is almost always the best, suggesting the
steroid monster permeated the game because baseball let it in.
The antitrust exemption did more than just give the owners of yesteryear
an upper hand against players and new owner wannabes. It created a culture
of invulnerability and arrogance that ultimately acted as blinders over the eyes
of baseball as it raced toward a dangerous cliff lured by the euphoria of drugs,
the metaphorical highs of long ball ecstasy, and the temptations of greed and
money.
The law of unintended consequences gripped baseball in a steroid vice that
desecrated the game the way any drug addiction usually does: shattered lives,
distrust, and broken dreams. Such malevolence often begins with a sense of
invulnerability where nothing can go wrong. And where would baseball get
such an invincible feeling? Not from fans or television or money, per se-the
other sports leagues have those things, yet other leagues have still doggedly
fought the steroid war for years.
74. The baseball strike during 1994-95 was MLB's ninth major labor dispute since just the 1972
season.
75. See, e.g., JOSE CANSECO, JUICED (2005).
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Even a strong union was not enough to turn back the steroid monster-the
union not only failed to try hard enough, it seemed to fight every meaningful
effort to implement a viable testing program. The summary and conclusions
of the Mitchell Report found that "[flor many years before 2002, the Players
Association opposed an[y] drug program that included mandatory random
testing, despite several proposals for such a program from different
Commissioners." 76 This Report also found that during the course of the
7
Mitchell investigation, "the Players Association was largely uncooperative." '7
Thus, the entire system of labor-management checks and balances failed all at
once. And since baseball has a history of changing the game to suit its needs,
specifically to enhance offense and home runs, why would the lure of steroid
induced homers be any less tempting?
The nexus between the steroid era and the logical belief that the game
could get away with it should be obvious. The cookie jar was full, and the
game clearly felt immune from retribution, much like the child who feels
secure in having bamboozled the unwavering support of one parent over the
other. The antitrust exemption has been baseball's ace in the hole since
1922-but it also has weakened the game in unforeseen ways of evolutionary
intervention, and therein lies the true problem.
No, baseball is not an evil game. It is neither benevolent nor evil-it is
merely an extension of us all. But beware the Shakespeare warning about
"protesting too much," especially as baseball vociferously backtracks from
steroids and the Mitchell Report. To the contrary, baseball needs to dig
deeper, to look under the steroid rug. After all, this is a game that still
pretends the seventy-three home runs in 2001 were not tainted, and still hints
that Roger Maris and his sixty-one dingers in 1961 somehow were (not
because of steroids, but for tarnishing the near religious home run milestone of
Ruth, which Maris eclipsed in 162 games, not Ruth's 154). Clearly, we are left
with a bigger question: has baseball itself been honest with the game, with
history, and with us? The game may not be "evil," but its front office integrity
has been suspect for decades, even preceding Kenesaw Landis. The steroid
era is only the game's most recent gaff.
REPEALING THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION

The antitrust exemption is not just a baseball enigma, and Congress should
intervene but not solely because of the steroid era. The law as it stands is a
grotesque legal anomaly, a brash endorsement of protectionism, and an

76. THE MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 63, at 11.

77. Id. at 8.
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arrogant testament to stubborn ignorance-none of which is helpful in a
democratic nation where the rule of law depends on fairness and public
acceptance. Consequently, there are at least six cornerstone reasons to repeal
the exemption now.
1. The genesis of the Federal Baseball ruling is tainted, and so the
decision itself is both tarnished and suspect in the first place.
2. Genuine or not, the original ruling is built on a wholly false premise:
that Major League Baseball is not a business in interstate commerce.
This is not only untrue now, it was false in 1922.
3. Congress does not need the exemption to maintain its grip on the
game. Congress is not dependent on the perpetual threat of repeal; it
already has enough subpoena power to rattle presidents, loose-cannon
senators and colonels, and even the non-exempt NFL.
4. The ruling is a high profile blemish on the integrity of law that almost
every sports fan understands as a boondoggle-hardly the right
attitude in a society where the perceived integrity of law is essential.
5. If baseball itself is not deemed interstate commerce, drug trafficking
certainly is. One could make a case for much of the game having been
a drug ring of sorts, so if Congress or the courts need a need a new
reason to revisit the game's exemption, all the rationale they need can
be found in the Mitchell Report.
6. The law of unintended consequences will strike again. Baseball's
artificial immunity and subsequent haughtiness have already played a
part in racism, involuntary servitude, collusion, and probably steroids.
Whatever may be next, it will probably be exacerbated by an antitrust
free pass.
CONCLUSION: CONGRESSIONAL HOBGOBLINS

Regardless of its inception, integrity, or propriety, the antitrust exemption
is certainly out of step with the modem world. It stands as a long out-dated
approach to revisionist legal theory and application, the need for which, if ever
there was one, is long past. For guidance, Congress need look no further than
Justice Holmes himself, who prior to Federal Baseball had published his
acclaimed "Path of the Law" essay in the Harvard Law Review, which noted:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
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vanished long since, and that the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past. 78
Allowing FederalBaseball to stand uncontested in the face of logic, law,
and the modem era is both a "blind imitation of the past" and an affront to
American legal integrity. It almost ruined the game more than once, and most
recently stands as a beacon of hypocrisy to the vulnerable youth of America.
Moreover, its inherent duplicity unnecessarily aggravates the perennial
national contempt for Capitol Hill that harkens the words of philosopher Ralph
Waldo Emerson, a highly regarded contemporary of Holmes's father, that
should serve as a warning to Congress, baseball, and the rule of law: "A
foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds. . .."79
"Perhaps ninety percent of baseball is half-mental," to quote a source
much closer to the game itself. 80 Could this also be true of politics, business,
and law? One thing can be predicted with reasonable certainty: if Capitol Hill
does not act to repeal the antitrust exemption, the steroid era will not be the
last aberration to tarnish the game of baseball.
"It will be like drjAi vu all over again."

8 1-Yogi

Berra
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